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ABSTRACT 
  
In the UK, motor vehicle insurance is governed by national and EU law. In respect of 
the EU requirement that member states establish a guarantee fund from which the 
victims of negligent uninsured or untraced drivers may obtain compensation, the UK 
entered into a series of agreements with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau (MIB). In 2015, 
the MIB established the Uninsured Drivers’ Agreement (UDA). This agreement 
implements (with the Road Traffic Act 1988 and the Untraced Drivers’ Agreement 
2003) aspects of the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives (MVID). The UDA 2015 
establishes clauses and procedural arrangements which, we argue, have largely 
removed legal certainty for policyholders and for the victims of negligent uninsured 
drivers. As such, the fundamental goals of the MVID and the free movement 
principles upon which they are based are undermined in the UK. This article offers a 
critique of the substantive breaches of the MVID through the UDA 2015’s exclusions 
and procedural arrangements, and identifies the current state of unpredictability and 
uncertainty when the two sources of law are compared. 
 
1. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE AND CERTAINTY 
 
The regulation of insurance for motor vehicles used on a road or other public place 
derives from national and EU law. Nationally, such insurance is governed through 
statutory and extra-statutory provisions. The statute (the Road Traffic Act 1988 
(RTA88)) at s. 143 necessitates a minimum of third party (liability) insurance is held 
by the owner of the vehicle to protect the innocent victim of a negligent insured and 
traced driver. The RTA88 also provides protection for the victims of uninsured 
drivers through (for example) enabling their claims directly against the policyholder’s 
insurers. However, in the event of the driver being uninsured, extra-statutory 
provisions
1
 take over. It is through the extra-statutory arrangements where a victim 
may recover compensation in the event that either the at-fault driver’s insurer is not 
contractually nor statutorily liable to compensate the victim, or that the individual 
causing the accident cannot be traced.  
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1
 In 1937, the Cassel Committee (Cmnd 5528), having reviewed the motor insurance legislation, 
recommended that a deficiency in the Acts be remedied through the creation of a central fund through 
which the victims of uninsured drivers would be able to recover damages. This led to the government 
entering into an agreement in 1945 with the insurance industry, through the created Motor Insurers’ 
Bureau (MIB), to undertake the central guarantee fund role. Thus, the MIB assumes the position of 
insurer for victims of accidents caused by uninsured and untraced drivers (protection for victims of 
untraced drivers (e.g. victims of a hit-and-run accident) did not become effective until 1969). 
 2 
The MVID is a collective term for a series of six EU directives
2
 relating to 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance. The aim, initially to facilitate the free movement 
principles of goods and people,
3
 extended latterly to reducing the negative effects on 
victims of accidents caused by uninsured
4
 and untraced
5
 motor vehicle drivers. The 
directives continued, incorporating revisions and extensions facilitating protection to 
a wider remit of vehicles and places where accidents involving such vehicles took 
place (e.g. public and private land). A requirement of the MVID was for member 
states to establish a guarantee fund, a compensation fund, an information centre and a 
central body to provide enhanced protection for injured victims of negligent 
uninsured, untraced, or foreign motorists.
6
 Member states were entitled to designate 
these tasks to a central body and in the UK, through an agreement between the 
Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB, the MIB satisfied this aspect of the 
MVID and in so doing acts as an insurer of last resort.
7
 The MIB’s agreements with 
the State consist of the UDA, most recently of 2015, and an Untraced Drivers’ 
Agreement (UtDA), established in 2003 but subsequently amended.
8
 
 
Given the relationship between the EU parent MVID and the national transposing 
provisions (incorporating the UDA 2015), the UDA 2015 is required to be in 
conformity with the MVID and the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). This provides the certainty necessary for citizens to 
understand the rights and obligations created through both sources. Hence both legal 
certainty, and the principle of justice (a fellow pillar of the rule of law), are required 
to be present in the legal issuance of the UDA 2015 and in its application.  
 
                                                        
2
 (The First Directive) Council Directive 72/166/EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member 
States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [1972] OJ L103/1; (the) Second Council 
Directive 84/5/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1984] OJ LL8/17; (the) Third Council 
Directive 90/232/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance 
against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles [1990] OJ L129/33; Directive 2000/26/EC 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in 
respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC 
(the Fourth Motor Insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65; (the Fifth Directive) Directive 2005/14/EC 
amending Council Directives 72/166/EEC, 84/5/EEC, 88/357/EEC and 90/232/EEC and Directive 
2000/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to insurance against civil liability 
in respect of the use of motor vehicles [2005] OJ L149/14; and (the Sixth Directive) Directive 
2009/103/EC relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the 
enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability [2009] OJ L263/11. 
3
 Abolishing frontier checks on insurance certificates. 
4
 A driver who caused or contributed to the accident and who, at the time held no valid policy of 
insurance, but who is identified. 
5
 A driver deemed responsible for the accident and who leaves the scene without identifying 
him/herself and cannot be traced. 
6
 This ‘green card scheme’ applies to accidents caused through the negligent driving of foreign 
motorists. The MIB may resolve the victim’s claim for damages and he/she is not then required to 
communicate with the foreign insurer. 
7
 Every insurer operating a business incorporating the underwriting of compulsory motor insurance is 
required to be a member of the MIB (RTA88, ss. 95, 143 and 145(2)). 
8
 While the MIB and the government develop a new UtDA to replace the 2003 agreement, it was 
amended at the same time as the UDA 2015. Similar provisions, as per the UDA 2015, in respect of 
exclusions for passengers with constructive knowledge, and what constitutes a subrogated claim have 
been applied. This provides a consistent approach to both matters between the two agreements. 
 3 
The CJEU
9
 has confirmed that legal certainty
10
 is a fundamental principle of EU law 
(even though it does not appear explicitly in the Treaties).
11
 Whilst a very broad 
concept, in essence it imposes upon member states a requirement for transparency, 
precision, stability and predictability in law-making.
12
 Legal certainty enables citizens 
to understand, in advance, the consequences that follow their conduct.
13
 It provides 
governance, identifies limitations and imposes order on permissible actions including 
rule-making and law-applying activities.
14
 This lends itself to the long and often 
complex negotiation, and the planning and administration, of the agreements 
concluded between the Secretary of State and the MIB. However, it is in both the 
drafting and in the judicial interpretation of the agreement with the parent MVID (at 
least until the UK determines if and on what basis it leaves the EU) where problems 
of certainty, and justice, exist. 
 
2. THE UDA 1999 AND 2015: HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF? 
 
In the intervening 16 years between the previous UDA (concluded in 1999) and the 
current agreement, jurisprudence from national and EU law, along with three further 
directives,
15
 had evolved and clarified much of the law relating to motor vehicle 
insurance. Hence, a textual reading of the UDA 1999 contained erroneous and/or 
misleading information, despite the publication of Supplemental Guidance Notes 
from 15 April 2002 which were designed to alleviate the most severe criticisms.
16
 
 
The UDA 2015 aimed to simplify many of the previous rules surrounding claims to 
the MIB. The UDA 1999 was widely disliked and broadly criticised due to the 
procedural rules applied
17
 (often placing an unfair burden on claimants) and which, if 
                                                        
9
 See Case C-236/95 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:341 where the 
European Court of Justice (now the CJEU) remarked: “the Court has consistently held that it is 
particularly important, in order to satisfy the requirement for legal certainty, that individuals should 
have the benefit of a clear and precise legal situation enabling them to ascertain the full extent of their 
rights and, where appropriate, to rely on them before the national courts (see to this effect Case 29/84 
Commission v Germany [1985] ECR 1661, paragraph 23, Case 363/85 Commission v Italy [1987] ECR 
1733, paragraph 7, and C-59/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2607, paragraph 18).” at [13].  
10
 A term first used by the CJEU in Cases 42, 49/59 Société nouvelle des usines de Pontlieue - Aciéries 
du Temple (S.N.U.P.A.T.) v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1961] ECR 
53. 
11
 It is a principle common to the legal systems of the member states – see J Temple Lang. ‘Legal 
Certainty and Legitimate Expectation as General Principles of Community Law,’ in U Bernitz, and J 
Nergelius. (eds.), General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer, 2000), 163. Legal 
certainty is enshrined in Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
2000/C 364/01. 
12
 See cases including Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075 at 1086; Case 
169/80 Administration des Douanes v Société Anonyme Gondrand Freres and Societe anonyme 
Garancini [1981] ECR 1931; Case C-182/03 and C-217/03, Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission 
[2006] ECR I-5479 at 69; and Case C-67/09 P Nuova Agricast and Cofra v Commission [2010] ECR I-
09811 at [77]. 
13
 T Takis. The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006), 242. 
14
 See for instance, Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘2014 Rule of Law Report Legal Certainty, Judicial Review, 
Appointment of Justices, Corruption Prevention’ Sustainable Governance Indicators. 
15
 The fourth, fifth and sixth MVID. 
16
 See for example commentary published in The Law Society Gazette 
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/motor-insurers-bureau-trouble-ahead/38186.fullarticle (last 
accessed 28 August 2016). 
17
 Evidenced in cll 7 (failure to use the MIB’s own application form), 9 (failure to provide the MIB 
with ‘proper notice’ of proceedings), 10 and 11 (failure to inform the MIB within seven days with 
 4 
not complied with, permitted the MIB to escape liability. The 2015 UDA removed 
many of these problems by enabling the MIB to be joined as a party to the action for 
the recovery of losses from the outset (cl 13(1)).
18
 This provided the MIB with 
adequate notice of proceedings,
19
 whilst also including a requirement for the claimant 
to issue the MIB with such information as it may reasonably require.
20
 
 
The UDA 1999 (in)famously included a “crime exception” where the MIB was 
allowed to exclude its liability to compensate claimants in the event that they 
knowingly allowed themselves to be carried in vehicles which: have been stolen or 
unlawfully taken;
21
 are uninsured; are used in the furtherance of a crime; or are used 
to avoid lawful apprehension. The latter two exclusions were not permitted in EU law 
although it took proceedings in state liability in Delaney v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2015]
22
 for the exclusion to be disapplied and removed in the 2015 UDA. 
 
The UDA 1999 included evidential “presumptions” regarding the knowledge held by 
the claimant which, following the Lords’ ruling in White v White [2001],23 brought the 
definition in line with that used in RTA88 ss. 143(3) and 151(4). Unfortunately, this 
interpretation and that used in RTA88 s. 151(4) continues to amount to a breach of 
EU law. The presumption relates to imputed knowledge which, to comply with the 
MVID, requires proof of the knowledge held by the claimant/third party rather than 
perceived or subsequent knowledge, or that the claimant ‘turned a blind eye’ to such 
evidence.
24
 The UDA 2015 replaces the phraseology “ought to have known” with 
“had reason to believe” which in practical application will have little impact on the 
problems which such constructive knowledge creates between national and EU law. 
The UDA 2015 does at least remove the previous drafting error contained in UDA 
1999 where it was the knowledge of the claimant that was applied, rather than the 
knowledge held of a passenger who died in the incident.
25
 
 
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015 excludes the MIB from liability for terrorist acts involving 
motor vehicles. This is a new inclusion compared with the UDA 1999, although it 
does appear in the UtDA 2003. It has been questioned whether the clause now 
clarifies matters related to the use of vehicle for terrorism-related purposes, whether it 
follows an interpretation restricting the liability of the MIB consistently with the 
RTA88,
26
 or where the inclusion of the word “use” of a vehicle restricts even the 
direct application of a vehicle for terrorist purposes (e.g. as a car bomb). However, we 
argue later that this inclusion is illegal in the blanket use of the clause, and will likely 
be removed by the courts / a revised UDA from the MIB. 
                                                                                                                                                              
details of various developments/additional information as the MIB may reasonably require) and 13 
(failure to request insurance information from the defendant driver / failing to use all reasonable 
endeavors to obtain the information / report the failure to provide that information to the police). 
18
 The MIB had already possessed this right following Gurtner v Circuit and the MIB [1968] 2 QB 587. 
19
 And hence the necessary procedural documents and court notices at the same time as the defendant 
receives these. 
20
 It is argued later in the article that the MIB has exceeded the requirement in this respect for 
information it reasonably requires to satisfy claims. 
21
 A similar exclusion applies in RTA88 151(4). 
22
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2015] 3 All ER 329. 
23
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9. 
24
 See White v White [2001] UKHL 9, per Lord Scott at [53]. 
25
 Phillips v Rafiq and the MIB [2007] 3 All ER 382. 
26
 AXN and others v Worboys and Inceptum Insurance Co Ltd [2013] Lloyd's Rep IR 207. 
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Ultimately, the UDA 2015 has simplified several aspects of the agreement and its use. 
It is approximately half the length of the 1999 agreement, and this is reflected also in 
the shortened guidance notes accompanying the UDA 2015 compared with the UDA 
1999. Many of the most unjust exclusions included in the UDA 1999 have also been 
removed in the UDA 2015. There are areas of motor vehicle insurance law where the 
UK exceeds the minimum standards required at EU law. However, this is not to say 
that the statutory law or the UDA 2015 complies with EU law in its entirety. This 
article presents some of the current problems which exist in the exclusions and 
procedural arrangements of the UDA 2015 (and which either were not rectified from 
the UDA 1999 or have introduced new infringements). 
  
3. UDA EXCLUSIONS 
 
Clearly, and specifically relevant to EU laws and their national transposing measures, 
legislative action and procedural rules which distort either a subject within the 
legislative instrument or the provisions between laws should be forestalled.
27
 The 
UDA 2015, in cll 4-10, outlines a series of exceptions to the MIB’s liability. In this 
latest agreement, and despite the implications of Vnuk
28
 and historic (and in places 
continued) inconsistencies between EU and national law,
29
 the Department for 
Transport seems to be ignoring
30
 the lessons issued following successful enforcement 
actions
31
 and to heed advice regarding compliance between the sources of law.
32
  
 
(A) Vehicles Requiring No Insurance 
 
Article 3 of the Sixth MVID requires the compulsory insurance of vehicles in member 
states. They are, subject to Article 5, to take all appropriate measures to ensure that 
civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in their territory is 
covered by insurance. In relation to accidents occurring in the UK, the MIB’s 
potential liability only extends to losses arising from accidents where there ought to 
have been insurance in place.
33
 In UDA 2015 cl 5,
34
 the MIB is not liable for any 
claim “arising out of the use of a vehicle which is not required to be covered by a 
                                                        
27
 Thus legal certainty being framed as an epistemic problem. 
28
 Case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2146. Note that, as 
detailed on the MIB’s website on 9 June 2016, the EC Commission is undertaking a review of 
Directive 2009/103/EC in light of the Vnuk ruling. 
29
 Leading to amendment, replacement or the agreements being supplemented, predominantly with the 
intention to bring the framework in to line with EU law (the UDA 1999 was amended on 7 November 
2008, essentially replaced (in respect of future incidents) on 3 July 2015, and the UtDA 2008 has been 
amended five times, on 30 December 2008, 15 April 2011, 30 April 2013, 8 June 2015 and 3 July 
2015). 
30
 See the correspondence received from the Department for Transport by Nicholas Bevan – 
http://nicholasbevan.blogspot.co.uk/search?updated-min=2015-01-01T00:00:00Z&updated-max=2016-
01-01T00:00:00Z&max-results=31 (last accessed 23 June 2016). 
31
 Delaney v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) and Delaney v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
32
 Nicholas Bevan has provided information and detailed accounts to both the UK Government and the 
EU Commission regarding the infractions of the law contained in the RTA88 and the UDA 2015 and 
UtDA 2003 (and their previous incarnations). 
33
 See Pt VI RTA88. 
34
 Similar provisions were included in the UDA 1999 clause 6.1 (a) and (b). 
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contract of insurance
35
 unless the use is in fact covered by a contract of insurance.” In 
its supplementary guidance notes, local authorities, the National Health Service, and 
the police are examples of public bodies that will meet claims arising from the use of 
vehicles in their ownership or possession and as such do not require insurance cover. 
Therefore, the MIB is not liable for any judgment arising out of the use of such 
vehicles unless the vehicle in question is in fact covered by insurance. In such 
circumstances the MIB’s obligation arises where the “insurer” does not satisfy the 
judgment. The result of cl 5 is that a victim of an unauthorised driver will be unable to 
recover compensation. This is in contrast to the requirements established in the Sixth 
MVID (the derogation from the obligation in respect of compulsory insurance of 
vehicles).
36
 Clause 5 breaches the MVID by allowing the guarantee fund body to 
avoid liability to victims in the event of injury caused by uninsured vehicles.  
 
(B) Deducting Compensation Payments 
 
Clause 6 of the UDA 2015 is broader in scope than the previous clause contained in 
the 1999 Agreement (cl 17).
37
 In cl 6, the MIB is provided with authority to avoid 
liability or to deduct the payments a victim of an uninsured driver would be entitled to 
receive through accident insurance payments / compensation (subject to certain 
exclusions). These exclusions, relating to payments from the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Authority and an employer’s non-insured refundable advance, and 
paragraph 3 which continues by penalising a victim for a failure to use (or to claim 
within time) from his own insurance, each act contrary to the rights a victim has at 
common law.
38
 It has been held
39
 that such a distinction between the MIB agreements 
and the common law in the protection of victims is unlawful. In McCall v Poulton
40
 
the Court of Appeal was faced with a taxi driver who, having been the victim of the 
negligent driving of Poulton, required a replacement vehicle and entered into an 
agreement with a company, Helphire. It transpired that Poulton was an uninsured 
driver and McCall, recovering compensation from the MIB for his personal injury and 
the damage to his property, was refused compensation for his hire charges. The UDA 
1999 (applicable at the time) did not extend to covering subrogation claims
41
 and the 
issue was not resolved due to the case being settled prior to a reference to the CJEU. 
Subrogation is a mechanism where motor vehicle insurers may recover monies paid in 
claims to their policyholders. It provides to the insurer a legal right to make a 
payment that is owed by another party (here the other driver or his insurance 
company). This process is important as often fault is an issue in motor vehicle 
accidents yet responsibility may not be determined until some time after the event. 
The policyholder may not be able to wait until this process is concluded before 
payments are made. His insurer will make payments to the policyholder and will seek 
recovery of these through the at-fault driver (or insurer where available). The 
                                                        
35
 per RTA88 s. 144. 
36
 Art. 5. 
37
 UDA 1999 cl 17 allowed the MIB to deduct from a claimant’s compensatory entitlement sums 
received from the Policyholders Protection Board (no longer applicable); an insurer under an 
agreement or other arrangement; and from any other source where the sums were paid in respect of 
injury loss or damage claimed in the proceedings. These exceed the permissible deductions outlined in 
MVID Art. 10(1). 
38
 Under the general rules of quantum. 
39
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9 at [34]. 
40
 [2008] EWCA Civ 1263. 
41
 Clause 6(1)(c). 
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policyholder claimant will be required to cooperate with the insurer in its pursuit of 
recovery of these costs and will be prevented in waiving the other driver’s 
responsibility for the accident. The UDA 1999 incorporated exclusions to the MIB’s 
liability regarding subrogated claims. Issues relating to what constitutes a subrogated 
claim, and hence which claims the MIB was obliged to meet, were particularly 
problematic and subject to litigation. The UDA 2015 cl 6(1) provides that subrogated 
claims are excluded, as are the claims of individuals who have other sources of 
redress available (for example, those with comprehensive insurance cover). 
 
The sixth MVID does allow for member states (via their guarantee fund body) to 
make deductions from a victim’s compensation award. In Art. 10, the obligation on 
the MIB is construed without prejudice for the member state “to regard compensation 
by… other insurers or social security bodies required to compensate the victim in 
respect of the same accident.” This paragraph is included to ensure that member states 
would not be placed in a position to offer double-compensation for a victim who has 
(for example) received payment through a state-run benefits system or who may have 
recovered funds through a compensation scheme. The MVID continues to require 
member states to provide full compensation for victims and does not permit 
subrogation against victims of motor vehicle accidents. At paragraph two, Art.10 
permits the MIB to “exclude the payment of compensation… in respect of persons 
who voluntarily entered the vehicle which caused the damage or injury when the body 
can prove that they knew it was uninsured.” Clause 6 UDA 2015 exceeds this 
limitation and fails to adhere to both the MVID and the EU’s equivalence principle.  
 
(C) Constructive Knowledge of an Uninsured Vehicle 
 
Clause 7 allows the MIB to avoid liability for damage to vehicles where, at the time 
of the damage being caused, there was no contract of insurance in force for the use of 
the vehicle and the claimant knew or ought to have reason to believe this was the 
case. The MVID specifically outlaw such an exclusion.  
 
Clause 8 applies to situations where the victim is a passenger in a vehicle, the driver is 
responsible for the accident, and the victim attempts to claim against the driver / 
anyone else who might be responsible for the driver’s use of the vehicle. Here the 
MIB is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, in respect of a relevant liability 
by a claimant who, at the time of the use giving rise to that liability, was voluntarily 
allowing himself to be a passenger in the vehicle. Further, this applies where: either 
before the start of the claimant’s journey in the vehicle or after its start if the victim 
could reasonably be expected to have alighted from it, [he] knew or had reason to 
believe that (a) the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken; or (b) the vehicle was 
being used without there being in force a contract of insurance complying with the 
RTA88. The areas of contention are identified in italics.  
 
Here the legal decision-making of the UK in relation to the MVID (the procedural 
component) and the attainment of a consistent and correct transposition of the 
directives and the obligation on member states to follow EU law (the rational 
component) are absent and certainty is put at risk. Both cll 7 and 8 maintain a 
phraseology used in previous incarnations of the UDA
42
 regarding the victim’s 
                                                        
42
 Clause 6 UDA 1999. 
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knowledge (or where he had reason to believe) that no (effective) insurance was in 
place covering the vehicle’s use at the time of the accident. Changes have been made 
to the wording from “ought to have known”43 to “had reason to believe.” Further, an 
acknowledgment of the ruling and construction of the UDA and the RTA88 ss. 143(3) 
and 151(4) in White v White
44
 has also been incorporated. Finally, the UDA 2015 
removed the EU-offending “crime exemption”45  of the MIB to victims who had 
knowingly allowed themselves to be carried in vehicles which were used in the 
furtherance of a crime. Despite these changes, it remains that the UDA 2015 is in 
breach of the MVID. MVID Art. 10(2) permits the exclusion of liability in relation to 
persons who the member state (or the MIB in the UK) can prove / knew the vehicle in 
which they were travelling was uninsured. In White v White,
46
 the House of Lords 
construed actual knowledge to include purposefully not enquiring about the status of 
the insurance when the victim suspected insurance cover was not in place / effective, 
and where the victim “turned a blind eye”47 to the fact of no insurance cover, but even 
this extension does not fulfil the requirements of the MVID as there is no equivalent 
provision in the directives. Clause 8 continues to impose constructive knowledge 
where the victim had no knowledge having entered the vehicle and subsequently 
discovers it is stolen or without the required insurance cover.  
 
(D) The Terrorism Exclusion 
 
Clause 9 of the UDA 2015 is a relatively succinct inclusion which provides:  
 
“[The] MIB is not liable for any claim, or any part of a claim, where the death, 
bodily injury or damage to property was caused by, or in the course of, an act 
of terrorism within the meaning of s. 1 of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000.”48  
 
This “terrorism exclusion” clause operates to void the MIB of liability in those 
specific circumstances and is a clause which began life in UtDA 2003 cl 5.1(g). The 
UDA 2015 clause refers to the definition as provided by the TA 2000 which is where 
potential problems exist.
49
 It is possible that the drafters of the agreement made 
reference to the TA 2000 s. 1 merely because it contains a broadly used definition of 
terrorism
50
 or due to its previous use in another of the MIB’s agreements. The 
opening paragraph of s. 1 reads:  
 
 (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— 
  (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
51
 
                                                        
43
 UDA 1999. 
44
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9. 
45
 Delaney v Secretary of State [2015] EWCA Civ 172. 
46
 White v White [2001] UKHL 9. 
47
 at [34]. 
48
 Although the use of this definition is not limited to the UDA 2015 – see for instance the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s 74; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 s 15; and the 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 s 54. 
49
 For a critical assessment of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 and broader aspects of human rights see C 
Gearty. ‘Terrorism and Human Rights: A Case Study in Impending Legal Realities’ (1999) 19 Legal 
Studies, 367. 
50
 The member states of the United Nations, as identified in a report published in 1988 (‘Political 
Terrorism’ Schmidt and Youngman) collectively had 109 different definitions. 
51
 Subsection 2 refers to actions including serious violence; serious damage to property; serious danger 
to health or public safety; endangering another person’s life; (which, according to the Court of Appeal 
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(b) the use or threat is designed to influence
52
 the government [or an 
international governmental organisation] or to intimidate the public or 
a section of the public, and 
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious, racial or ideological cause. 
 
Beyond the debate regarding whether the term terrorism should be defined broadly or 
tightly,
53
 it is probable that this clause of the agreement was created with the view of a 
vehicle being used as a weapon
54
 and/or car bomb
55
 and would consequently, in 
accordance with EU law, not constitute a normal use of a vehicle and therefore result 
in no insurance being held.
56
 However, the agreement does not provide this limitation. 
By using the TA 2000 s. 1 the case law establishing the scope and effect of the Act is 
applicable. It is possible that a consequence of cl 9 using the TA 2000 is that in a 
situation where, for example, an individual who is a victim of a road traffic accident 
caused by an uninsured driver fleeing the scene following the use or threat of action, 
made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause 
would not be able to rely on the MIB as insurer of last resort. Evidently, terrorism 
may constitute racism, nationalism, separatism, extremist ideology, religious 
fundamentalism (and so on). It may also constitute single-issue campaigns.
57
 Whilst 
mercifully rare in the UK, the US has been subject to interested groups joining and 
utilising terrorist methods. Challenges in this way regarding animal rights, 
environmental and anti-abortionist movements (as forms of single-issue extremism) 
have led to laboratories and clinics being bombed and the individuals working in 
these industries being attacked and in some instances killed.
58
 Therefore, a third party 
victim of a road traffic accident caused by an uninsured driver of a car fleeing the 
scene following his murder of a nurse employed at an abortion clinic / an arsonist 
having killed victims employed at an anti-GM crop facility (for example) may find, 
under its current reading, that cl 9 UDA 2015 excludes the MIB from liability. 
Victims of other non-terrorism offences committed in similar ways, would however 
be protected. Hence the third party victim of a road traffic accident caused by an 
uninsured driver of a car fleeing the scene following his murder of a clerk during his 
                                                                                                                                                              
in David Miranda v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 6 involves intent 
or recklessness on the part of the individual (para 55)) or action which is designed seriously to interfere 
/ disrupt an electronic system.  
52
 Despite Lord Carlile’s efforts to have the term changed to ‘intimidate’ - The Definition of Terrorism 
(Cm 7052, 2007), para 86(11).  
53
 Substantial debate, prior to the enactment of the TA 2000 and following its commencement, has 
demonstrated concerns over the nature of its definition of terrorism and what may constitute an act of 
terrorism. It is, however, not the purpose of this article to critique the wider implications of the use of 
this definition in the fight against terrorism. 
54
 See Seddon v Binions [1978] RTR 163 for the use of a vehicle to intentionally injure a person rather 
than being indicative of an act of terror for the purposes of TA 2000 s 1. 
55
 As has been used in mainland Britain on several occasions by organisations including (allegedly) the 
Real IRA - http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1201273.stm (4 March 2001). 
56
 The TA 2000 definition of terrorism is itself questionable as to its appropriateness for the various 
purposes to which it is applied – see C Walker. Terrorism and the Law (OUP, 2011). 
57
 Indeed, in its consultation paper, the Government had identified three different forms of terrorism – 
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animal rights, environmentalist and anti-abortion activists). See Cm 4178, Legislation against 
Terrorism, paras. 2.2 and 2.6. 
58
 See Home Office and Northern Ireland Office Legislation Against Terrorism. A Consultation Paper, 
Cm 4178 (London: Stationery Office, 1998) para. 3.12. 
 10 
bank robbery would be able to claim from the MIB according to the UDA 2015.
59
 
Public policy would be remiss to allow such a distinction to exist as, if protection here 
is to be afforded to the third party victim, it surely makes no difference to him what 
purpose (lawful, unlawful, terrorism-related or otherwise) the driver was involved 
with when the victim was injured.  
 
It remains possible, as this clause has yet to be tested in court, that the interpretation 
of “… in the course of…” may follow that used in maritime insurance law. 
Similarities exist between this rule and the loss or damage to insured property due to 
the perils of piracy. Where this area of law may be useful in respect of the UDA’s 
terrorism exclusion clause is in the interpretation of the use of violence when making 
good an escape following the actual insurable loss having occurred. Therefore, in the 
case of piracy, damage or loss is not deemed a consequence of piracy when it occurs 
during an escape.
60
 Hence, the judiciary could follow a similar line of reasoning to 
restrict the attribution of loss caused by a driver following his act of terror (and hence 
the terrorist act has been completed and any accident caused during his motor vehicle-
based escape would not be considered to have occurred “… in the course of…” such 
action). However, irrespective of whether the application of cl 9 follows the 
hypothetical example as provided above or that available in another strand of 
insurance law, a plausible, and indeed unfortunately more likely scenario, is where 
motor vehicles are used as weapons in terrorist attacks. As way of examples, France 
has been subject to vehicular terrorist attacks on four occasions between 2014-2016; 
such attacks have been relatively common in Israel (seven attacks between 2008-
2014) and even in the UK, in 2013 a car was used in the (terrorist-based) murder of 
Fusilier Lee Rigby. It is a breach of the MVID to continue the terrorism exclusion. 
 
Had the MIB wished to protect itself against liability for genuine acts of terrorism, it 
could have used, for instance, the definition provided in the Reinsurance (Acts of 
Terrorism) Act 1993 s. 2(2) which avoids the negative consequences of the TA 2000 
s. 1 with regards public intimidation (if not directed to the specified ends identified) 
and the highly problematic element of acts / threats of acts which advance a political, 
religious, racial or ideological cause. It would also have been better served to have not 
used a definition of terrorism which has been the subject of dispute and controversy 
prior to its enactment. In relation to EU jurisprudence, the CJEU in Vnuk
61
 ruled, prior 
to the establishment of the UDA 2015 (and incredulously in relation to the public 
commentary on the case and its implications, the MIB did not take its effects into 
consideration) that vehicles must be used for their intended purpose. Beyond the 
scope of this would constitute some form of misuse and the MVID would not have 
effect or impose compulsory third-party insurance invoking national bodies such as 
the MIB. There was thus no requirement or useful function played by the inclusion of 
cl 9, yet despite its redundancy, it is present and is a breach of EU law. The measure 
has not been tested, and is likely to be rejected in judicial review or through further 
legislative action, yet the MIB is, at the time of writing, silent on the issue, and the 
UDA 2015 and the supplementary information provided on the MIB’s website 
                                                        
59
 Similar arguments, when considering the implications of removing the motive element of the 
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60
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61
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remains unaltered. Legal certainty is lacking with this provision despite knowledge by 
the government that cl 9, in its current form, is illegal. Subjects to this rule are entitled 
to have ascertained facts to enable their compliance with the law, and in the event of 
silence on the matter, the principles of temporal law will be applied. Hence, in the 
absence of clear instruction to the contrary, a legal rule has immediate application. 
Neither the MIB or the government has informed subjects to the law of the potential 
illegality of cl 9 or whether it will be applied, be modified when tested in court, or be 
removed via a new agreement.  
 
4. PROCEDURAL ANOMALIES 
 
The victim of an uninsured driver is required to follow the procedural rules 
established in the MIB Agreements if he is to be successful in recovering 
compensation from this body. Road users and pedestrians in the UK are entitled to 
clear guidance regarding not only their rights in relation to compulsory insurance 
provisions but also the circumstances and extent to which public authorities may 
interfere with these rights. The imposition of procedural rules which are deployed, for 
instance, in arbitrary forms, negatively impact on the attainment of legal certainty, 
justice and reasonableness. Examples exist of irrationality in the application of the 
procedural rules underlying the UDA 2015, and here we identify some of the more 
serious (although it is beyond the scope of this article to provide an exhaustive 
examination of all the failures of transposition within the UDA 2015). The inclusion 
of such procedural rules, like the exclusion clauses outlined above, are not only 
incorrect in their scope, but also unsustainable in relation to the level of the infraction 
committed to the victim and when compared with the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 
which contain no similar application of such harsh tests or strike-out policies.  
 
(A) Compulsory Arbitration and Limited Appeals 
 
Under the UDA 1999, the MIB was to cause any application for a payment under the 
agreement to be investigated and decide whether to make an award.
62
 Following the 
decision and the reasoned reply regarding the application, the applicant could decide 
to accept and be paid the award
63
 or he could appeal to an arbitrator.
64
 A significant 
factor relating to the previous arbitration process was that, under the general rules on 
arbitration laid down by the Arbitration Act 1996, the victim may, in certain cases, 
appeal against the award to the High Court of Justice. The right of appeal is, of 
course, subject to procedural and substantive rules; however, it is automatically 
available to a victim alleging serious irregularity
65
 which affects the arbitration. 
Further, the right of appeal is also available to the victim (subject to the granting of 
leave of the High Court) in the event of the victim’s allegation of an infringement of a 
rule of law or the conclusion of a decision which no arbitrator could have reasonably 
reached based on the evidence considered.
66
 Having obtained leave from the 
competent court, subsequent appeals could be made to the Court of Appeal and then 
to the House of Lords (now Supreme Court). On the basis of this process, and the 
                                                        
62
 Clause 7. This is made in spite of the fact that clearly the MIB is not a court (see Case C-63/01 
Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB [2003] ECR I-14492 at [48]). 
63
 Clauses 9 and 10. 
64
 Clause 11. 
65
 Arbitration Act 1996 s 68. 
66
 See Case C-63/01 Evans v Secretary of State for Transport and the MIB [2003] ECR I-14492 at [51]. 
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balance it afforded between costs and speed of decision making, the result was that 
this system did not render it practically impossible or excessively difficult to exercise 
the right to compensation conferred on victims of damage or injury caused by 
unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles. Hence, in accordance with the Second 
MVID, the arbitration process and decision making of awards complied (held the 
CJEU in Evans) with the principle of effectiveness and provided the protection to 
victims as required by that directive.
67
 
 
The CJEU’s ruling in Evans is unfortunate in this regard and suggests that scrutiny of 
the effects and consequences of these procedural rules was not undertaken, or was at 
least accepted on face value. The UDA 1999 enabled the MIB to determine whether 
to deny to a victim any compensation payment where he failed to issue to the MIB 
“… such information about the relevant proceedings and… such documents as MIB 
may reasonably require.”68 Similar provisions are not included in the MVID or the 
RTA88, and a disparity exists between these rules and those available in the civil law 
(and the protections present therein through rules of evidence and even extending to 
the rule of law and the determination of legal rules to be determined by law, not 
discretion). 
 
One of the more insidious inclusions in the 2015 UDA is in cl 17. Any dispute as to 
the reasonableness of MIB’s requirements under cll 12 or 14, and which cannot be 
resolved by agreement, must be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Secretary of 
State following a request from either MIB or the claimant. The clause establishes the 
procedure to be adopted which involves the MIB sending to the appointed arbitrator 
and to the claimant, in writing, the reasons for the referral together with its views on 
the dispute. The claimant may thereafter (within 28 days) provide to MIB and to the 
arbitrator in writing any further specific observations he wishes to make in relation to 
the dispute. The arbitrator will then decide the dispute based solely upon the written 
submissions before him and his written decision will be final.  
 
On face value, this may not appear particularly noteworthy, until sub-clause 3 is 
considered. Here, the arbitrator determines disputes on the basis of written 
submissions and his decision is final. There is no scope for appeal to higher courts, or 
a review of decisions other than in those written forms. Opportunity for cross- or 
direct examination of witnesses are lost. It also appears that due to the restrictions 
imposed on the arbitrator it may preclude the consideration of EU law, and details are 
lacking as to the procedure of the appeal and on what bases it must be made and by 
whom. The claimant, who by including the MIB in proceedings is doing so because of 
the lack of available damages from the tortfeasor and is seeking redress from the 
insurer of last resort, has legal protections available in the national legal system 
denied to him.  
 
The inclusion of a compulsory arbitration element to the resolution of disputes 
between the victim and the MIB is sufficient to breach the legal certainty of EU law. 
Even given the latitude issued to member states as to their procedural measures and 
the application of these, such an imposition renders it impossible for an effective 
review of the decision of the arbitrator. That the arbitrator is appointed by the MIB 
                                                        
67
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68
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further compounds this error, despite their fee being paid by the MIB. A further 
significant problem with the present system of MIB appeals is the lack of appeals 
from an arbitrator on points of fact or in the exercise of his discretion. Given the 
nature of motor vehicle insurance claims, these are the very issues likely to be at stake 
in an UDA arbitration. It is questionable whether transferring these matters to a 
person appointed by the MIB rather than the State is acceptable.  
 
Victims of a negligent uninsured driver are entitled to seek compensation from the 
MIB, they have not transferred rights to another body, they have not waived their 
rights to due legal process by their need to seek compensation from the state’s 
guaranteed fund, and the agreements concluded between the state and their preferred 
provider of insurance protection do not entitle either party to disregard the 
fundamental requirements of effectiveness and equivalence of EU law.
69
   
 
Certainty and non-arbitrariness may be achieved where the law’s procedural and 
rational components are secured. The forms of decision-making in the application of 
the arbitration process are not consistent with the rights of claimants outside of this 
narrow field (i.e. those available to claimants under the common law). The propensity 
for procedural irrationality in the absence of review mechanisms and in the (in)ability 
to examine and challenge evidence and the underlying rationale for awards is 
prevalent. The result of the imposition of a system of compulsory arbitration must be 
unreasonable at common law and under the MVID.  
 
5. EQUIVALENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The UDA 2015 and UtDA 2003 (as amended) each consist of deficiencies which 
breach EU law and would enable enforcement mechanisms to be pursued. This is a 
matter of subsidiarity and consequently how the law is actually enforced is a matter 
for the state to determine in relation to the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence.
70
 This has caused problems in the application of the MIB agreements 
(particularly so the UtDA 2003) as there exists no obvious comparable civil procedure 
by which to test the equivalence criterion.
71
 Conversely, the EU parent MVID and its 
imposition of obligations on the state is a matter of EU law and the underlying 
principle applicable here is its ability to be invoked in domestic courts. Hence, every 
citizen in the member state has the guaranteed protection of his rights, and this applies 
regardless of the choice of body / procedural route the state wishes to adopt. The 
result is that where the claimant applies to the MIB for redress, seeking to obtain an 
enforcement against it through use of the MVID, and this fails (either due to the 
absolute refusal of the MIB to entertain such an argument or because an appeal court 
holds the MIB as not satisfying the criteria as an “emanation of the state”),72 the fact 
that the claimant has sought to invoke EU rights obliges that court to give effect to the 
MVID due to the primacy of EU norms. This will manifest itself in a change in either 
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the obligations between the MIB and the Secretary of State or a direct changing of the 
agreement itself.
73
 
 
Engaging with public policy on the matter is necessary to raise awareness
74
 and to 
compel a review of the UDA 2015. Further, pending these required changes, it is 
necessary to inform educators and lawyers
75
 in exercising the range of tools available 
through domestic enforcement mechanisms.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The legitimacy of the MIB UDA 2015 as a source of authority is questionable. There 
exist several substantive and procedural anomalies within the agreement which lead to 
uncertainty in its content and application, and provide inconsistencies between the 
national law and the EU parent directives. Both the substantive and procedural 
requirements articulated in the UDA 2015 do not operate in the abstract, nor are their 
criteria trivial or without consequence. They impact on individuals and the lack of an 
effective system of review (beyond the actions individuals may take in state liability 
against the UK) constitutes an abrogation of individuals’ rights guaranteed at EU law.  
 
It is a necessary truth that some element of uncertainty has to be found in legal 
systems
76
 and their application, but that which is found in the current version of the 
MIB agreement is almost inexcusable. It provides the uninitiated (and even lawyers 
and the judiciary) with few guarantees as to the correct application of national and EU 
law, whether the available governance structures are appropriate for their functions, 
and any semblance of the limitations of the actors involved in the rule-making or what 
currently establishes “permissible actions” in national law.  
 
The UDA 2015 requires a purification – the disposal of ineffective, contradictory, 
obsolete and unenforceable rules, replaced with a clear and compliant structure which 
adheres to domestic and EU laws and principles. These rules should be properly 
published; clear as to their content; consistent with other sources of law (including the 
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MVID); identify the application of the rules and their commencement dates; adhere to 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations; and be enforceable.
77
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